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1 Introduction 
Developing countries are typically characterized by relatively low levels of 
competition and limited or no formal competition policy. It is also generally the case 
that government procurement accounts for a significant share of public spending, 
and the procedures for awarding and monitoring contracts lack transparency. In this 
sense there are linkages between weak competition and public procurement, 
although we treat the two issues separately. Measures to promote and/or regulate 
competition and to make procurement more transparent offer potential benefits in 
enhancing the competitiveness and efficiency of the business environment. The aim 
of this paper is to review the literature to identify what measures may be appropriate 
for developing countries, in particular for Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). We focus on the ACP 
because these countries are currently strengthening, to varying degrees, their 
regional integration agreements as they negotiate Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs) with the EU. These EPAs are intended to replace the Lomé and Cotonou 
Agreements (see Morrissey and Zgovu, 2007), and one specific aim of this paper is 
to assess if there is any role for including some commitments towards competition 
policy and government procurement in the EPAs and/or the regional agreements 
underpinning them. 
Two features of many developing countries render them particularly prone to anti-
competitive business practices, in particular abuses of dominant position. The first is 
that a small, or very small, number of firms tend to dominate many sectors, so de 
facto competition is limited. In part this arises because they are small markets that 
can only sustain a few large firms; in principle, openness to imports could provide 
competition, but in practice there is protection (or, for some utilities that have 
features of natural monopolies, the goods or services are non-traded). In part it may 
reflect a tradition of State-owned enterprises, which may even be monopolies; while 
privatization addresses this, it is necessary to ensure that privatization actually 
introduces competition (rather than a private monopoly replacing a public one). The 
second is that the institutional framework is weak – the legal contract system and 
property rights enforcement may be weak, and there is no tradition of competition 
policy. However, it is precisely because these countries are prone to abuses of 
dominant position, whether by domestic or foreign firms, that it is important to 
invest the time and resources required to establish the institutions to address basic 
competition policy. Although there are no reliable estimates of the cost to an 
economy of the absence of a competitive environment, there is widely accepted 
evidence that competition per se encourages lower prices and increased efficiency, 
facilitating a business environment conducive to investment and growth. 
There are many policy options that can increase competition in the domestic market 
– deregulation, trade liberalization and other market opening policies are examples. 
Competition policy may then be seen as the institutional mechanism that ensures 
that the newly freed markets remain accessible and contestable, and the 
Competition Authority (CA) is its organizational counterpart. All these instruments 
should be seen as complements rather than substitutes (International Competition 
Network (ICN), 2003). As it is desirable to promote competition, and difficult to keep 
a close eye on the invisible hand (market mechanisms are less than perfectly 
transparent and firms have considerable scope and incentives to engage in restrictive 
business practices), there are potential benefits to be had from establishing some 
level of competition policy in developing countries. The discussion here concentrates 
on ACP countries to allow us to consider the potential of including (minimal) 
commitments for competition policy in regional integration agreements and in related     4
EPAs; the latter can support the establishment of effective CAs, and this is likely to 
be beneficial. ‘The evidence that competition policy can  be made to work in 
developing countries indicates that it can have a positive impact on the institutional 
environment’ (Holmes, 2003, p12). While competition policy can be implemented 
effectively at the country level, regional cooperation and coordination are important, 
given trade and foreign investment, and EPAs can support this also. Furthermore, in 
the context of EPAs, improved trade facilitation (Milner et al, 2008) and increased 
investment (Morrissey, 2008) can increase competitiveness and competition in 
domestic and regional markets, increasing the need for some competition policy. 
Similar issues arise for public procurement, as this is an element of competition in an 
economy. National, regional and international initiatives aimed at regulating public 
procurement have increased considerably in recent years. Many developed and 
developing countries have undertaken reforms of their national procurement systems 
and have reached agreements opening up their procurement market to international 
competition, in particular those who have signed up to the Government Procurement 
Agreement (GPA) in the WTO.  These reforms are aimed at ensuring that public 
funds are used in the most efficient and economic way and that the system delivers 
value for money, the view being that these can be achieved by promoting 
transparency, probity and accountability. Some ACP countries have already 
undertaken reforms of their procurement systems (e.g. South Africa) and others are 
in the process of reforming them (e.g. Haiti). 
As regards the opening up of the procurement market to foreign competition, 
agreements have been reached at both the regional and international level. These 
agreements involve mainly developed countries. At the international level the most 
significant efforts for opening up public procurement have been reached with the 
GPA, a plurilateral agreement signed within the auspices of the WTO between some 
WTO Member States, mostly developed countries. However, the GPA does not bind 
all WTO members but just the signatory country to the agreement (the EU and its 
Member States are all parties to the GPA). The rationale behind the initiatives aimed 
at opening up public procurement to international competition is that protectionist 
measures in public procurement can constitute barriers to trade and competition; 
they risk disrupting the best allocation of resources worldwide and cause 
inefficiencies and waste of public resources and taxpayers’ money.  
This paper begins in Section 2 with a review of issues regarding the desirability of a 
competition policy, including some problems and concerns, in the light of the 
incidence of anti-competitive practices in SSA countries (the only ACP countries for 
which good documentation is available). Section 3 discusses the issues that arise in 
establishing a competition policy and includes some guidelines on initiating the 
process. Section 4 provides an overview of the (economic) literature on opening up 
procurement, given the size of the ACP procurement market, and outlines the main 
potential sources of welfare gains. Section 5 considers some of the concerns and 
problematic issues related to agreements on procurement, in particular why 
developing countries appear opposed to such agreements, with specific reference to 
EPAs. Section 6 offers some conclusions, arguing that there are potential gains for 
ACP states in making commitments to competition policy and opening up 
procurement in regional agreements; EPAs could promote this process, although the 
issue is inherently controversial. The potential gains are not unconditional and 
problems are likely to arise in terms of harmonization of rules. Nevertheless, as ACP 
countries move towards greater regional integration, competition and procurement 
are issues to be considered in this context. 
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2   Why Competition Policy? 
Over the last two decades world economies have become increasingly interlinked in a 
wave of globalization affecting production and service activities.  Interpenetration of 
national markets through international trade has led to increased competition (from 
falling transportation and communication costs, more liberal trade regimes and 
increasing foreign direct investment) in some cases, as well as restricted competition 
in others (e.g. through use of contingent protection measures, mergers and 
alliances, misuse of technical barriers to trade including testing and quality controls, 
labeling rules and certification procedures, discriminatory government procurement, 
anti-competitive business practices).  
Competition policy can be defined as a set of measures employed by government to 
ensure a fair competitive market environment for all enterprise participants in the 
market, with competition laws being one among such measures.  While trade policy 
limits the misbehaviour of governments (in the trade arena), competition policy 
limits misbehaviour by firms, which is even more important when trade (and 
investment) are liberalized (Jacquemin et al, 1998).  Competition policy aims to 
ensure that markets remain competitive (through anti-trust or anti-cartel 
enforcement) or become competitive (through liberalization). The latter is 
particularly important in ACP countries where there is often only one or a few major 
firms in important sectors, so potential abuse of dominant position may be a 
concern. This is especially relevant for most utilities where network economies of 
scale imply that many of these markets are natural monopolies (telecommunications 
is probably an exception given the rising importance of mobile phones, see OECD, 
2006). In the context of utilities, regulation may be as important as competition per 
se, and privatization does not in itself address competition issues. However, 
regulation is an element of competition policy and it remains true that viable 
competition is desirable, as it tends to be associated with greater efficiency and 
lower prices, while competitive markets are associated with greater levels of 
technological innovation and enhanced welfare.  
The EU has included competition provision in the bilateral agreements it has entered 
with its partners, for example, Mexico, South Africa, Middle East and North African 
(MENA) countries, and ACP countries.  There is evidence from agreements with 
South Africa and Northern Africa that they have promoted liberalization and provided 
support for adjustment (Africa Trade Policy Centre, 2006). In the case of the 
Cotonou Agreement there is a provision for reinforced cooperation in policy 
formulation and efforts to progressively promote effective enforcement of policies.  
Such competition provisions include elements of negative and positive comity with 
respect to cooperation on cases as well as technical assistance and support in 
developing the competition culture and institutions in the concerned countries. 
Competition provisions are also included in some of the regional arrangements 
involving developing countries, for example the East African Community (EAC), 
COMESA and CARICOM. The EAC includes a Competition Bill prohibiting anti-
competitive practices and a Competition Committee with the power to investigate 
and compel evidence (WTO, 2007, p. 25). A provision in Article 55 of COMESA bans 
restrictive business practices that distort trade within the future common market, 
although some exclusions are permitted subject to approval by the COMESA Council.  
Work is underway to develop a regional competition policy, suggesting a model 
appropriate to EPA discussions of competition. 
The role of competition policy (indeed competition) in the development process is 
controversial. Governments of developing countries are concerned about the possible 
consequences of enforcing a broad competition law on several counts. First, that it     6
will limit their use of industrial policy in general and the protection of national 
champions in particular. This reflects the view that market mechanisms should be 
complemented by government intervention and industrial policy measures, at least in 
the early stages of development. Maximizing competition may not be optimal for 
promoting the long-run rate of growth of productivity. The example usually provided 
is that of the East Asian experience, where countries concentrated on achieving co-
operation and competition rather than necessarily promoting greater competition per 
se (Singh, 2002). Second, that the prevention of private anticompetitive practices 
which restrict market access will make their markets more vulnerable to imports. 
Third, that stronger competition will tend to reduce domestic profit rates, discourage 
investment (including FDI) and entrepreneurship (Jenny, 2006). Fourth, in 
economies with a significant informal sector, concern arises that competition law will 
constrain only those firms operating in the formal part of the economy. Finally, there 
is pessimism about the ability of developing countries to implement competition 
laws, as to be effective they require a strong state (Singh, 2002).  
The opposing view emphasizes the links between competition policy and economic 
growth and development (OECD, 2003, 2006). Foreign investors are more likely to 
be willing to invest in a country where there is an effective and transparent 
competition policy, insofar as this promotes a better business environment (see 
Morrissey, 2008). Deregulation and liberalization of financial and capital markets will 
enhance the attractiveness of operating in the formal sector. Competition policy can 
also force firms to become more efficient, increasing their competitiveness in both 
the domestic and export markets. There is no simple relationship between economic 
growth and a country’s ability to implement interventionist economic and industrial 
policy, including competition policy. Optimal competition policy will differ between 
countries depending on their stage of development and the effectiveness of their 
governments as well as the supporting institutional framework. 
There is some evidence that a more competitive environment is conducive to growth. 
OECD (2006) construct and analyse an index of pro-competitiveness, where the 
highest scores (lowest competitiveness) are in low-income countries (and lowest in 
high-income).  The index comprises trade, investment and competition components, 
of which trade policy (followed by investment policy) seems to be most important in 
explaining cross-country differences. There has only been a slight improvement 
(lower index value) for low-income countries over the last five years. Countries with 
more pro-competitive policies (lower index values) exhibit higher trade levels than 
less competitive countries (mostly low-income). Improving competitiveness policy 
could have a significant impact on trade: if developing countries reduced their index 
to the level of OECD countries, their trade could increase by almost a third. This 
would contribute to an increase in per capita GDP by almost 8% on average (OECD, 
2006: Table 4, p21) 
Singh (2002) argues that it is important for developing countries to establish formal 
competition policies, primarily because of structural changes due to privatization and 
deregulation. Many privatized firms are natural monopolies while the international 
cross-border merger movement during the last decade (previous merger waves were 
mostly national) have seen firms trying to achieve a dominant position in specific 
markets and bigger size in a global market. Although the incidence of cross-border 
takeovers via FDI is much lower in developing countries as compared with developed 
countries, it is a trend. There are also mergers between large corporations within 
developing countries.  
The main difficulty in reconciling these views is the lack of solid evidence one way or 
the other. This is largely a problem of measurement and reflects the variety and     7
range of practices that fall under the general ambit of competition policy. An 
advocate of strengthening competition policy in developing countries recognizes this 
ambivalence concluding that there are ‘no convincing macroeconomic studies 
demonstrating the existence of a positive and strong correlation between the 
intensity of competition law enforcement and the rate of economic growth (in 
developed or developing countries). However, there is a fair amount of evidence that 
countries which engage in proactive competition policies designed to increase the 
intensity of competitive pressures (open trade and investment policies, regulatory 
reform etc.) tend to fare better than other countries’ (Jenny, 2006, pp. 110-11). 
Perroni and Whalley (1998) quantify the potential gains of developing countries from 
the introduction of disciplines on competition as being as high as 5-6 per cent of 
national income. These gains include those stemming from the replacement of 
antidumping measures by competition law, reduction of mark-ups by foreign 
suppliers and reduced concentration in domestic markets.  
One should not overestimate the extent to which these views are incompatible, or 
the extent to which there is a strong argument against promoting competition 
(provided it is ‘fair’, hence the value of competition policy). The concerns of 
developing country governments seem focused on markets and industries in the 
early stages of development. The considerable government direct and regulatory 
involvement provides some control over the types of firm behaviour otherwise 
subject to the scrutiny of a competition authority. But beyond some threshold the 
advantages of competition are more widely recognized. Successful privatization 
programs would founder if private monopolies or cartels replaced public monopolies. 
Furthermore, the sectors that are typically favoured by industrial policy have limited 
overlap with those where competition concerns are most common in developing 
countries (such as bus transportation, retail sales of food, petroleum or drugs 
distribution, basic construction materials, bakeries, and the distribution of water, gas 
and electricity) (ICN, 2003). Governments frequently exempt some sectors from the 
application of competition law. These often include those important for the 
preservation of cultural diversity (parts of the media for example) or those heavily 
regulated in any case (energy and parts of agriculture for example) (ICN, 2003).  
Similarly the advocates of competition policy generally accept that, though it is 
always desirable, it may not be a high priority in the early stages of development. 
But they note that a competition policy will need to be introduced at some stage if 
the development process is successful, and they emphasize that it takes time to 
build a “competition culture” – and there is evidence that ‘the existence of a 
competition culture was important for the success of Competition Authorities’ 
(Holmes, 2003, p11). Until the 1990s most developing countries operated without a 
formal competition policy - formal competition policy was not needed because of the 
level of state control, price controls etc. State-owned enterprises were enjoined not 
to charge monopoly prices. It takes about ten years for countries to acquire the 
necessary expertise and experience to implement such laws effectively while the 
experience of developed countries indicates that it takes several decades before the 
full effects of CP enforcement on market behaviour are realized (Jenny, 2006). 
The CUTS 7-Up Project (Holmes, 2003), a comparative study of the competition 
regimes of seven developing countries that had some sort of competition law and 
authority in place, four in sub-Saharan Africa (South Africa, Zambia, Kenya and 
Tanzania – the latter had only just introduced competition policy), and the others in 
Southern Asia, provides evidence that competition policy is both feasible and 
beneficial in developing countries. While the study was largely descriptive, hence it 
was difficult to reach general conclusions, on the basis that it is easier to refute     8
propositions ‘we can reject the claim that a competition authority (CA) cannot 
possibly function in a least developed economy; and we can reject the claim that a 
good law is sufficient to ensure that an effective policy is implemented; most 
interestingly we can reject the proposition that a competition authority in a less 
developed country will never dare even attempt to stand up to a sceptical 
government’ (Holmes, 2003, p4). Political will and a legal framework are 
prerequisites, and adequate resources and trained staff are necessary if a CA is to be 
able to tackle business interests. South Africa and Zambia both appeared to have 
fairly effective CAs, despite being at opposite levels of relative development. 
However, as shown in the next section, this did not prevent a high incidence of anti-
competitive practice in these countries. 
 
Prevalence of Anti-competitive Practices 
Developing countries exhibit segmented product markets, discretionary government 
regulations and considerable corruption, hence they tend not to have a very 
competitive environment. There are considerable barriers to entry and exit, and 
policies often favour large firms in access to finance and other measures. Firm 
concentration ratios in developing countries are quite high relative to advanced 
countries, although the share of small enterprises in total employment is higher in 
developing countries. This suggests a pattern t h a t  i s  l i k e l y  t o  a p p l y  i n  m o s t  A C P  
countries: although there are numerous micro-enterprises, most sectors are 
dominated by a few firms, providing scope for abuse of dominant position. 
Such abuse appears to be widespread. Recent efforts have uncovered reports and 
allegations of a wide range of anticompetitive practices, mostly associated with 
abuse of a dominant position. Jenny (2006) lists the following for Africa alone: 
•  Concentration in trade and (purchasing) price fixing agreements among 
traders – coffee in Kenya, cotton, tea, tobacco in Malawi, fish processors and 
exporters in the Lake Victoria region. 
•  Inflated prices for inputs, particularly chemical inputs – fertilizer tender cartel 
to Kenyan Tea Development Authority. 
•  Chicken price fixing – Zambia. 
•  Milling cartelization – Malawi, Zimbabwe, Zambia. 
•  Monopolies in foodstuffs- milk and sugar in Malawi 
•  B e e r  s e c t o r  v e r y  c o n c e n t r a t e d  i n  Z a mbia, South Africa, Kenya, Tanzania, 
Namibia – convincing evidence that mergers in this sector sometimes 
motivated to limit competition. Also rife with vertical restrictive agreements 
limiting scope for competition at the retail level – Zambia, Kenya. 
•  Soft drinks – acquisition of local bottlers by multinational firms results in high 
structural concentration – Kenya (merger part allowed by Kenyan competition 
authority). Anticompetitive vertical restraints – Kenya (quantity forcing, retail 
price maintenance or suggested retail price), Zambia. 
•  Retailing – South Africa. 
•  Passenger Transport (buses, taxis, airlines etc.) – Matatu owners cartel in 
Kenya, Taxis in Cape Town. 
•  Oil company cartel-like behaviour in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia 
(prosecutions for price fixing), Malawi, South Africa.     9
•  Construction materials – Cement monopolies or cartels - Malawi, South Africa 
(officially sanctioned cartel to 1996), Tanzania and Zambia. 
•  Professional services – recommended Attorney fees - South Africa; health 
care fees – South Africa; surveyors’ cartel – Zambia. 
•  Banking services – concentrated in South Africa and Uganda. 
•  Insurance services – price fixing in Kenya. 
•  Telecommunications – entry barriers by incumbents in South Africa; price 
fixing in Uganda; Zambia; Nigeria. 
•  Freight Transportation – trucking rates set by Operators’ Association, rail 
monopoly, monopoly shipping service on Lake Malawi. 
•  Sugar cartel – South Africa. 
 
Table 1: Allegations of Anti-competitive Practices in SSA, by Type of Practice 
 









Num.  %  Num.  %  Num.  %  Num.  % 
Abuse of Dominant Position  39  6.32  16  3.73  24  6.58  10  8.62 
Anti-competitive Merger  33  5.35  13  3.03  14  3.84  8  6.90 
Barriers to Entry  8  1.30  6  1.40  6  1.64  0  0.00 
Bundling 1  0.16  0  0.00  1  0.27  0  0.00 
Collusion 55  8.91  29  6.76  31  8.49  10  8.62 
Contractual Discrimination  4  0.65  1  0.23  2  0.55  1  0.86 
Creation of a Monopoly  3  0.49  2  0.47  1  0.27  2  1.72 
Cross-subsidization 3  0.49  1  0.23  2  0.55  0  0.00 
Denial of Infrastructure  6  0.97  1  0.23  4  1.10  0  0.00 
Exclusive Arrangements  23  3.73  9  2.10  10  2.74  6  5.17 
Hoarding 4  0.65  4  0.93  4  1.10  1  0.86 
Horizontal Agreements, 
Cartels  189  30.63  142  33.10  102  27.95  27  23.28 
Minimum Resale Price  3  0.49  1  0.23  2  0.55  1  0.86 
Monopolistic Practices  166  26.90  155  36.13  113  30.96  34  29.31 
Predatory Pricing  27  4.38  17  3.96  18  4.93  9  7.76 
Tying 3  0.49  1  0.23  2  0.55  1  0.86 
Vertical Agreements  7  1.13  3  0.70  5  1.37  2  1.72 
Violation of Merger Control 
Regulations  5  0.81  1  0.23  5  1.37  0  0.00 
Unspecified Practices  38  6.16  27  6.29  19  5.21  4  3.45 
                
Total 617  100.00  429  100.00  365  100.00  116  100.00 
Note: The entire sample covers the period 1995-2004; the columns for 2002-04 show how the incidence (at 
least of reporting) has increased significantly in recent years.. 
Source: Evenett, Jenny, and Meier (2006), www.evenett.com/ssafrica.htm   
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Further recorded allegations of uncompetitive behaviour are reported in Evenett et al 
(2006) as shown in Table 1.  The reported allegations are derived from a database of 
allegations of private anti-competitive practices made in SSA publications, principally 
in newspapers and other periodicals.  Since these are allegations the findings from 
this approach must be interpreted with caution.  Nonetheless, this database 
represents the first comprehensive attempt to assess the prevalence of different 
types of private anti-competitive practices in SSA. A total of 515 different allegations 
of anti-competitive practices in 41 business sectors affecting 34 African countries 
were recorded since 1995. By a large margin the most frequent allegation reported 
concerns business operators forming cartels, especially outside of South Africa – 
which would indicate the presence of a relatively strong anti-cartel policy stance in 
South Africa (there is some support for this in Holmes, 2003). Allegations against 
foreign firms, some of which are South African operating elsewhere on the continent, 
account for one fifth of the total number of allegations. 
Another feature evident in Table 1 is that the incidence of allegations increased 
significantly in 2002-04, which accounts for a substantial share of the total in the 
sample period 1995-2004. Evenett et al (2006) show that South Africa accounts for 
about a third of all allegations, which can be attributable to its relative size. What is 
perhaps more interesting is that only ten other countries have 10 or more allegations 
apiece, ranging from Kenya (57), Zimbabwe (41), Cote d’Ivoire and Zambia (40 
each), to Nigeria (24), Malawi (17), Uganda (11) and Congo DR (10). Some 33 
countries have fewer than 10 allegations: neither relative size nor income is a robust 
indicator of the number of allegations (Kenya and Zambia are small and poor relative 
to Nigeria, and Malawi in particular seems ‘over-represented’). Although allegations 
are evident in almost all sectors, they are most common in manufactured foods and 
beverages, telecommunications, oil, air transport, land transport and chemicals. As 
noted above, OECD (2006) identifies potential gains from implementing pro-
competition reforms, including competition policy, in telecommunications (and, to a 
lesser extent, in transport sectors). 
Jenny (2006) draws the following lessons from his empirical survey: 
 
1.  There is considerable scope for anticompetitive practices in developing 
countries in terms of both the variety of practices and sectors in which they 
occur. 
2.  There are many instances of anticompetitive practices in countries such as 
Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe, where there is very little political support for 
existing competition institutions and where Government officials routinely 
assert that competition law enforcement is neither useful nor necessary for 
developing their country.  
3.  Many anticompetitive practices or transactions emanate from local firms, 
sometimes sizable regional firms (e.g. beer in Africa). MNEs are not the only 
source of anticompetitive practices affecting developing countries.  
4.  The proposals for potentially anticompetitive mergers involving firms that are 
simultaneously present in several neighbouring developing countries, and the 
fact that such firms appear to pursue regional strategies in terms of 
investment, marketing, production, employment and competition (e.g. beer, 
cement) suggests benefits from regional agreements on competition law 
enforcement. 
5.  Anticompetitive practices particularly affect poor consumers.     11
6.  Poor farmers are often victimized by the large firms that supply their inputs 
(chemicals, fuel, banking, insurance), intermediaries (traders in tea, coffee, 
tobacco and fish) and operators of freight transport. 
7.  Anticompetitive practices also involve key industrial inputs (steel, aluminium, 
sugar).  
 
Although there is considerable evidence that anti-competitive behaviour is 
widespread, there is little direct evidence on the costs of such behaviour in 
developing countries. The pioneering study on cartels (Levenstein and Suslow, 2001) 
estimated that products of the 19 international cartels prosecuted during the 1990s 
represented nearly 5.2% of total imports of developing countries and 1.25% of their 
GDP. The estimated annual over-charge of imports to developing countries was $15-
25billion, equivalent to 33-50% of the annual aid provided by developed countries 
(Jenny, 2006, p. 112).   
Furthermore, there is little evidence that would allow one to quantify the benefits of 
a competition policy (e.g. the CUTS study includes no such evidence). In part this is 
because competition laws in different countries vary considerably according to 
definition of dominance, treatment of cartels, and enforcement (see World 
Competitiveness Yearbooks, and Singh, 2002). One could identify cases where the 
presence of competition policy, or CAs in the case of the CUTS study, lead to action 
being taken against particular instances of anticompetitive practices. Indeed, if the 
actions were demonstrably effective it may even be possible to identify positive 
benefits (e.g. reductions in prices). However, it would rarely be possible to 
generalize this to an impact on GDP or growth. This does not imply that competition 
policy is not beneficial, simply that the benefits are hard to quantify. 
 
3   Issues in Establishing a Competition Policy 
The OECD (2003) argues that there are three broad components to building an 
effective competition policy for developing countries, and provides a useful review of 
issues, especially regarding the design of competition policy. The first is creating a 
competition culture. This involves persuading stakeholders, including politicians, 
officials, business groups, labour groups, the legal fraternity, regulators, academics 
and the press, of the merits of competition. As Holmes (2003) notes, political will 
and a legal framework are prerequisites, but adequate resources and trained staff 
are necessary if a CA is to be able to tackle business interests. ‘The cases involving 
FDI that were researched suggested that foreign investors did respect a credible CA, 
and that competition policy should not be seen as an additional bureaucratic obstacle 
to entry’ (Holmes, 2003, p12). The problems associated with establishing the 
appropriate ‘standing of the CA’ amongst the relevant stakeholders are analysed in 
ICN (2003, Chapter 2, which also provides a discussion of relevant experience in 
developing and transition countries). Those suspicious of competition law are likely 
to be well resourced and politically influential.  
The second component is correcting structural and institutional distortions in an 
economy characterized by concentrated, non-competitive structures. These may be 
dominated by state-owned enterprises, in which case privatization or corporatization 
may be a necessary step. They may also reflect inappropriate and inefficient 
regulation, particularly of the network infrastructure such as transportation, 
telecommunications, energy, and financial and professional services. The third, is 
putting in place an effective enforcement mechanism for dealing with private     12
anticompetitive conduct. The prevailing view is that openness to trade will not be 
enough for most economies, i.e. allowing imports may be insufficient to introduce 
competition. Many markets are local in character and insulated from the discipline of 
international competition.  
To fulfill these three components, the CA will need to perform two broad functions – 
enforcement of competition law and advocacy of competition policy. The relationship 
between the CA and the Government will have a significant bearing on how it 
performs these functions. There seem to be two dominant models of this relationship 
(ICN, 2003). One is for the CA to be firmly established in the executive apparatus, 
with strong formal powers and influence over legislation and government 
interventions that affect competition. This model has proved popular in transition 
economies where extending markets and defending markets from the state is a 
priority. In the second model the CA is separate and independent from the 
government. This gives it greater freedom in enforcement decisions, but implies that 
its influence over government actions will depend on its powers of advocacy and 
degree of political support. This model is more appropriate where markets are firmly 
established.   
Because the establishment of a competition culture takes so long it is best to start 
the process early. This suggests enacting a Competition Law with limited application 
in the first instance. The idea would be to choose an area where it is most likely to 
be visible and effective, and to then strengthen the Law as experience is gained and 
credibility is established. A country newly adopting a Competition Policy is likely to 
be characterized by markets with a high concentration, a history of state 
intervention, a newly established Competition Authority with limited resources and 
enforcement capabilities, and a lack of political will to enforce the Law against 
powerful interests. For this reason an initial focus on “hard core” cartels is 
recommended. These cover Agreements to fix prices, restrict output, submit 
collusive tenders or share markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories or 
lines of commerce. They involve a particularly serious and harmful form of anti-
competitive conduct (OECD, 2003), and are not generally associated with any 
legitimate economic or social benefits. Such behaviour is prohibited in almost every 
national competition law. Cartel enforcement is considered a highly promising field 
for a new CA, because a large number of horizontal anticompetitive agreements are 
likely to be present, and, while their detection requires wide ranging investigatory 
powers, their prosecution does not require as much economic expertise as other 
types of anticompetitive practices. It is noted that cartels can operate effectively 
through tacit collusion rather than explicit agreements in small or highly 
concentrated markets. In some cases competition law includes provisions allowing a 
CA to infer an anticompetitive agreement from parallel behaviour (e.g. the steel 
cartel in Brazil, Jenny, 2006, p. 136). However, other agreements, such as Research 
Joint Ventures, could be considered as legitimate approaches to reduce costs or 
increase efficiency. The evidence suggests that for developing countries the cost of a 
CA is small relative to the cost of cartels (ICN, 2003).  
Success in anti-cartel efforts depends on international cooperation as cartels operate 
in secret and important evidence may be located abroad, whilst international cartels 
grow in importance as markets become global. It is therefore difficult for a single 
national authority to prosecute without cooperation, and this provides an argument 
for establishing regional authorities, even if their remit is fairly limited. This is 
particularly relevant in the context of EPAs: although regional institutions tend to be 
quite weak, EPAs could include measures to support regional cooperation on 
competition policy. Given the market power of large multinationals, even with     13
legislation regional authorities may not have the power to restrain cartels and other 
uncompetitive conduct. Problems include inadequate development of the legal and 
institutional framework, lack of information and difficulty of establishing evidence. 
Anti-cartel legislation in advanced countries does not normally extend to developing 
countries, e.g. exports are often exempted. The implication is that developing 
countries would require co-operation from advanced countries to cope with anti-
competitive behaviour of advanced country cartels between the large multinationals. 
However, the CUTS study suggests that domestic systems can work. Although 
‘several of the CAs observed felt that they were wholly powerless to intervene in the 
case of mergers by multi-national firms operating in their markets ... those that did 
seek to intervene found that they could do so effectively’ (Holmes, 2003, p8).  
Whether a new CA should also be given merger control powers is also controversial. 
On one side is the argument that the issues involved can be too complex for a new 
and inexperienced Authority. On the other side is the view that a new CA can 
develop a reputation more easily and quickly in merger cases, because the notifying 
parties have a duty to provide the relevant information. As countries liberalize they 
open up opportunities for cross-border mergers and alliances, inter alia.  From a 
competition policy point of view, mergers and alliances create a dominant market 
position which undermines competition in the affected markets.  This is not to deny 
that under certain conditions mergers (at the aggregate level) can be profitable to 
participants and socially desirable (due to economies of scale) in a closed economy 
as well as in an open economy (Falvey, 1998). 
Enacting a sound competition law is a step towards participation in international 
cooperation in the competition policy area. A country must acquire a reputation for 
fair and effective enforcement and have effective procedures for protecting 
confidential information. There are obvious benefits from cooperation in merger 
cases, including avoiding inconsistent or conflicting rulings and duplication of efforts, 
although (international) cooperation may be inhibited by (national) confidentiality 
requirements. 
For very small countries regional cooperation may be the only viable competition 
policy strategy. It ‘is quite likely that the cost of establishing a competition authority 
in small economies (such as, for example, the small island economies of the 
Caribbean), or in some of the least developed countries of Africa, may be very large 
compared to the resources of the country … Furthermore, given the relatively small 
size of the national markets in these economies, most competition problems may 
best be handled in a regional context’ (ICN, 2003, p23).   
Competition law and its enforcement through multilateral agreements will likely be 
subject to the core principles for multilateral arrangements (OECD, 2003):  
[1] Non-discrimination. The most relevant aspect here is national treatment. It is 
possible that laws implementing industrial or other types of public policy could be 
excluded from coverage. As noted earlier, exemptions, exceptions and exclusions 
from competition laws are commonplace (export cartels for example). For least 
developed countries there may be circumstances where the application of the special 
and differential treatment (S&D) concept is appropriate.   
[2]  Transparency.  At the international level this has two components: (a) the 
obligation to make publicly available all relevant laws, regulations and decisions; (b) 
provision for notification of forms of government action to the members of the 
arrangement. Genuine transparency requires that the CA disclose both the 
substantive basis for its decisions and the procedures by which it arrives at them. 
Transparency in both process and decision-making is also important in establishing a     14
reputation for impartiality, objectivity and independence from the undue influence of 
government or business (ICN, 2003).   
[3]  Procedural fairness. I t  i s  a c c e p t e d  t h a t  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a n d  j u d i c i a l  p r o c e d u r e s  
vary substantially across countries. Protection of confidential information from 
unwarranted disclosure is seen as particularly important.  
Whether competition policy is to be adopted at a regional or national level, it is clear 
that governments and newly established CAs can benefit from the experience of 
others, particularly those who underwent the same process at a similar level of 
development. In paragraph 24 of the Doha declaration the ministers recognized the 
“need of developing and least-developed countries for enhanced support for technical 
assistance and capacity building” in competition policy. OECD (2003, pp36-38) 
discusses the many forms that technical assistance and capacity building can take, 
from large conferences to internships. It also describes (pp26-33) peer review 
mechanisms that can be used to inform both directly involved parties and the public 
in general about international best practice. These can help prompt reform from 
within, contribute to transparency, and are a mechanism for sharing information and 
experiences. They may also bring about convergence in law and policy over time.  
 
4   Improving Public Procurement 
Many developed and developing countries have undertaken reforms of their national 
procurement systems aimed at ensuring that public funds are used in the most 
efficient and economic way and that the system delivers value for money. 
Increasingly, governments recognize the (financial) savings from a better organized 
and transparent procurement system (Hunja, 2003). The main objectives of the 
public procurement reforms are value for money, efficiency, transparency, probity 
and accountability (Arrowsmith, 2005). A related issue is opening up of the 
procurement market to foreign competition, where agreements have been reached at 
both the regional (e.g. EU) and international (e.g. GPA) level. The rationale behind 
opening up public procurement is that protectionist measures in public procurement 
can constitute barriers to trade (and competition) that promote costly inefficiencies 
(Atkins Study, in The Cecchini Report 1988).  
Given the size of government procurement,
1 enhancing both the efficiency of the 
procurement process through targeted reforms and opening up procurement to 
foreign competition can bring significant advantages to governments. Studies on the 
effect of opening up procurement to international competition show that competitive 
procurement practices promote efficiency in public spending and help public 
authorities acquire cheaper, better quality goods and services at lower costs; 
European Commission (2004) suggests that enhanced competition and transparency 
reduce prices by around 30%. Open, non-discriminatory and transparent procedures 
can also help boost the competitiveness of firms operating in public procurement 
markets (The Cecchini Report 1988). 
The theoretical literature on the effects of public procurement on international 
specialization and trade flows is limited. Most studies have focused on microeconomic 
aspects related to the efficiency of the tendering process. A recent review of the 
literature on the effects of discriminatory procurement (Trionfetti, 2003) illustrates 
the effects that favouring home suppliers and products can have on international 
                                                 
1 For instance, According to a study by the European Commission, in 2002 the total 
EU procurement market was worth €1.5 trillion or over 16% of EU GDP.      15
trade. Whether home-biased procurement influences trade flows and international 
specialization depends on the market structure (which might change from sector to 
sector) and on the size of government procurement. In particular, discriminating 
procurement is likely to influence international specialization in sectors characterized 
by monopolistic competition and increasing returns. Trionfetti (2003) shows that two 
types of inefficiencies may arise as the consequence of discriminatory procurement: 
inefficient production of government output and inefficient specialization of the 
country. Evenett and Hoekman (2005) argue that fostering either domestic 
competition or transparency in state contracting tends to improve national welfare. 
They find no clear-cut effect on market access of ending discrimination or improving 
transparency. 
While there is a large literature on the effects of liberalising procurement within the 
European Union, given the many studies carried out for the Commission (indicating 
significant benefits), there are few studies reporting data on procurement for ACP 
countries. The information available on the size of the procurement market in 
developing countries, and ACP states in particular, is sometimes contradictory and 
vague. For instance, World Bank (2003) reveals that in India total
2 procurement 
amounts to US$100 billion. The WTO’s Trade Policy Reviews show that Malaysia 
spends some 20.6% of GDP on procurement (WTO Trade Policy Review, doc 
WT/TPR/S/156, 2006, p. 47); Colombia spent, in 2004, between US$7,900 and 
$13,000 million on procurement (doc WT/TPR/S/172, 2006, p. 82); and in Kenya 
government procurement is estimated at some 8% of GDP (doc WT/TPR/S/171, 
2006, p. A1-65). For ACP countries in general, procurement is contestable 
procurement (i.e. procurement that is potentially open to competition) is likely to be 
equivalent to 5-10% of GDP. 
However, when considering the size of contestable procurement in developing 
countries one has to take into account that a considerable part of procurement in 
ACP states is financed through aid which is very often tied to the procurement of 
goods and services from the donor country (i.e., irrespective of the Government’s 
own policy, procurement is not open). This has consequences in terms of the scope 
of an agreement on procurement between the EU and ACP states. Indeed if the aid is 
tied, procurement needs to be limited to goods/services originating in the donor 
country only, thus the scope of an agreement for opening up procurement is reduced 
(see below). 
A further point that needs to be considered when the term public procurement is 
defined is whether the definition adopted includes public undertakings and local 
authorities (OECD, 2002). The exclusion of purchases by public undertakings and 
local authorities could result in big differences between states both when defining the 
size of the procurement market and when assessing the impact that any agreement 
on procurement could have. Indeed, if procurement will be defined as to exclude, 
from the coverage of the procurement agreement, public undertakings and local 
authorities, the size of the procurement market risks being underestimated and the 
impact of the procurement agreement itself will be weaker in those countries where 
public undertakings and local authorities play a central role compared to countries 
where procurement is mainly carried out by central authorities. Therefore, any future 
EPA agreement on procurement will have to carefully consider which entities will be 
                                                 
2 Procurement of goods and services carried out by ministries, departments, municipal and 
other local bodies, statutory corporations and public undertakings both in the Centre and in 
the States. 
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covered, after a thorough analysis of the procurement markets of the EPA countries 
involved. 
 
Gains from Transparent Procurement 
Following the literature, the gains from more open procurement are considered in 
respect of enhanced transparency, increased competition and reduced corruption. As 
Trepte noted there are three main aspects of transparency: what transparency is, 
why it is desirable and what are the consequences of a non-transparent procurement 
system (Trepte, 2004). Many trade agreements on procurement prohibit 
discrimination and include transparency requirements to support and render effective 
this prohibition. In this respect, transparency rules are aimed at preventing public 
authorities from concealing discrimination in favour of national suppliers and goods. 
As Arrowsmith pointed out, transparency rules also support other objectives such as 
probity, preventing corruption (see below), deterring abuse of discretion, maintaining 
the confidence of contractors in the system and are also used as a means to prevent 
covert discrimination (Arrowsmith, 2003). 
 
It is therefore reasonable to assume tha t  a n  a g r e e m e n t  i n  E P A s  w i l l  i n c l u d e  
transparency rules (as it should). 
Transparency in procurement requires similar principles as applied for competition 
policy above, i.e. clear rules and clear procedures for implementing the rules. 
Transparency entails that procurement procedures should be "characterised by clear 
rules and by means to verify that those rules were followed" (Westring and Jadoun, 
Procurement Manual for Central and Eastern Europe, p.6). The literature consulted 
reveals that three factors are essential for a public procurement regime to be 
classified as transparent. Firstly, the existence of clear public procurement rules is 
required. All participants should be informed about the procurement rules that will be 
applied by the contracting authority (for instance what are the criteria for selecting 
the suppliers, for awarding the contract etc). The existence of clear rules allows 
participants in the procedure to know in advance how it will be conducted and to 
behave accordingly. Secondly, procurement opportunities should be public in order to 
enable all possible interested suppliers to participate (this is achieved by publishing 
procurement opportunities on national, regional and international 
bulletin/newspapers); and thirdly the opportunity should be given to scrutinise 
decisions and to enforce the rules in order to ensure that the procurement agency 
has adhered to the rules and that the decision was not motivated by self-interest but 
was taken having regard only to commercial consideration.  
A lack of transparency can impede the ability of foreign firms to bid for contracts 
even if there is no intended discrimination (Arrowsmith, 2003). When a procurement 
system is characterised by non-transparent rules foreign suppliers can be reluctant 
to enter the market, “as bidders must trust in the fairness of process to participate in 
a tender, the perception of transparency is crucial in attracting the largest possible 
number of tenders and increasing competition” (ADB/OECD 2006). The result of a 
lack of transparency can be a substantial loss for governments’ budgets. Case 
studies reveal that excess costs can be in the range of between 25-50% (Rose-
Ackerman cited in Evenett and Hoekman, 2005). Another possible effect of a non-
transparent system is an increase in the information costs, which, in turn, raises the 
marginal costs of firms and so the prices of the goods/services (Evenett and 
Hoekman, 2005). Further, the lack of transparency can be the result of corruption     17
and self-interest of procurement officials. The importance of transparency is that it 
makes visible what would otherwise be disguised and allows the actions of the 
procurement agency to be scrutinised and monitored (Trepte, 2005). 
Many are the measures usually implemented for achieving transparency, including 
making procurement laws and administrative regulations publicly accessible; 
ensuring broad advertisement of procurement opportunities in journals of national 
and international relevance (for instance EU Member States are required to advertise 
in the EU official Journal procurement opportunities falling within the EU procurement 
directives thresholds); limiting the use of negotiated procedures to very limited and 
well defined cases giving preference to the use of more open procurement methods 
such as open tendering or restricted procedure; give the possibility to all bidders to 
be present at the opening of tenders; the requirement that all criteria for evaluating 
tenders shall be stated in advance in the contract documents.  
An additional, important, element of any transparent procurement system is 
ensuring that suppliers are giving the possibility to complaint against a procurement 
decision and that there are in place effective and independent review and complaint 
systems.  
However, there are also potential costs of multilateral rules on transparency 
(Arrowsmith, 2003; Rege, 2001). For instance, running a procurement competition 
through an open procedure is more costly than running it through a negotiated 
procedure. Constraints on substantive discretion can affect the entities’ capacity to 
achieve value for money, or can render too burdensome and lengthy the 
procurement process. Further, transparency rules alone are not sufficient to ensure 
probity (see below). Therefore, careful attention is to be paid to the rules to be 
chosen to achieve transparency. The rules need to take into account the 
characteristics and preferences of the regulated jurisdiction.  
Transparency rules are common in the EU and are embodied in the EU procurement 
directives. Rules on advertisement of procurement opportunities, time limits, 
notification of the award of the contracts etc. are all aimed at increasing 
transparency and at ensuring a level playing field between suppliers of different 
nationality (transparency rules are also present in the GPA). Many studies relate to 
the benefits from opening up procurement and from increased transparency within 
the EU (to realize benefits, opening up must be with transparency rules). However, 
in the EU effective competition in the procurement market is facilitated by the fact 
that enterprises registered in one EU country have got freedom of establishment (for 
instance by setting up subsidiaries) in other EU countries, standards of products are 
harmonised and direct and indirect barriers to trade are generally abolished. Further, 
the legal system within each EU country and the European Court of Justice ensure 
that EU rules are actually and effectively enforced. This needs to be taken in mind 
when devising agreements on procurement in EPAs, the full benefits of an open and 
transparent procurement market cannot occur without correlated institutional 
reforms.  
Transparency is often considered a value in itself and interested parties, from both 
the EU and ACP side, could take into consideration the possibility of reaching an 
agreement on transparency only, which does not involve market access and the ban 
on discrimination against foreign suppliers. A transparency agreement on 
government procurement could be thought to have beneficial effects and to result in 
enhanced market access. However, if the agreement is limited to transparency only 
without any provision on non-discrimination and market access, the benefits are 
significantly reduced (Arrowsmith, 2003). Some recent studies on an agreement on     18
transparency in government procurement negotiated within the auspices of the WTO 
have demonstrated that the possible effects of an agreement concentrated solely on 
transparency (without also opening up) are limited (and likely to fail, given the 
renowned reluctance of developing countries to sign up to it). Evenett and Hoekman 
(2005) have shown that there is no clear-cut relationship between transparency in 
procurement and market access. This has cast doubts on the magnitude of the 
potential benefits of embedding rules on transparency in government procurement in 
trade agreements- whether multilateral or regional. Evenett and Hoekman (2003) 
argue that if the self-interest of procurement officials motivates non-transparency, 
any market access gains from introducing transparency are likely to be less than if 
non-transparency was motivated by protection.  
 
Enhancing Competition and Reducing Prices 
The evidence gathered from studies conducted on the effects of the procurement 
directives enacted in the EU suggests that public procurement prices paid by public 
authorities in the EU are lower when the directives are applied. The application of 
procurement rules appears to reduce prices by around 30%. Price reduction is due to 
enhanced competition. It is evident that in a situation of tight budgets, a saving of 
30% on government purchases can be extremely beneficial. European Commission 
(2004) shows that in a sample of firms involved in procurement activities, 46% 
carried out some type of cross-border procurement. However, direct cross-border 
procurement remained low, accounting for just 3% of the total number of bids 
submitted by the sample firms. The rate of indirect cross-border public procurement 
is higher, with 30% of the bids in the sample being made by foreign firms using local 
subsidiaries. Therefore, one element that seems very important is the possibility to 
set up subsidiaries in the host state; in this context, open procurement could attract 
investment and foster competition. 
Given the size of public procurement markets the importance of these improvements 
is clear. Competitive, transparent procurement markets help government acquire 
goods and services at lower cost. For effective competition to maximise the effects of 
opening up procurement it is important that firms have the possibility to set up 
subsidiaries in the host country. If the advantages of an agreement on procurement 
are really to be achieved any EU proposal in EPAs should include provisions for 
facilitating setting up business in the third country (this is related to measures on 
foreign investment, see Morrissey, 2008).  
 
Reducing corruption 
The public procurement process can provide opportunities for corrupt officials to 
engage into illegal practices (Trepte, 2005). Corruption in public procurement is a big 
problem for developing countries because it leads to a significant waste of (already 
scarce) public funds. According to the World Bank specialist Uzma Sadaf, in 
developing countries 20-25 percent of spending on procurement is lost due to 
leakages and malpractices. Hence, a large portion of funds goes to waste. For 
instance, she estimated that the total GDP of Pakistan was $112 billion in 2004-05. 
The anticipated public procurement was $17-22 billion in that period, under which, a 
loss of $3.4 - 5.5 billion is considered under the leakage percentage criteria.
3   
                                                 
3  ResponseNet, Posted: Monday, January 22, 2007 10:34:50 available at 
http://216.239.59.104/search?q=cache:OQVKtYOflVAJ:www.responsenet.org/show.    19
As Arrowsmith et all noted corruption in public procurement can cover various types 
of practice and can involve various forms of collusion between government and 
bidders. For instance: 
•  the procurement entity may award contracts on the basis of bribes rather 
than on the basis of the best quality and price of the products; 
•  contracts may be awarded to firms in which one has a personal interest; 
•  contracts may be awarded to political supporters  
Corruption can occur in the execution as well as award of contracts e. g. officials can 
collude with bidders to allow them to claim extra payments for non-existent work 
(Arrowsmith et all, 2000). The procurement planning and the delivery phase are 
particularly exposed to corruption and need to be carefully monitored (ADB/OECD 
2006). The award of contracts on the basis of corruption will prevent authorities 
achieving value for money, since contracts will not be awarded to the best firms and 
for the best products. Further, corruption scandals may deter both national and 
foreign firms from bidding for future contracts. Prices may be higher both because 
contractors do not face real competition and because contractors need to insert in 
their “costs” the bribe paid to procurement officials. 
Procurement measures for combating corruption include transparency measures (as 
seen above); conflict of interest rules; criminal penalties on bidders; procurement 
penalties on bidders: exclusion and debarment. However, “Procurement regulation is 
able to close off a number of those opportunities but it cannot address the wider 
causes or prevalence of corruption” (Trepte 2005).  
As Trepte points out corruption in developing (and developed) countries is due to 
many reasons and often related to the structure of government itself, especially the 
low pay of employees (Trepte, 2005). Corruption also depends on many factors 
related to the society itself and on how corruption is socially perceived (Linarelli). 
Corruption also depends on the lack of mechanisms to make redundant officials who 
have been proved guilty of corruption. Corruption depends on the lack of 
enforcement and monitoring systems and on the lack of an effective system of 
debarment for suppliers who have been accused of corruption.  
These problems need to be addressed if procurement rules aimed at fighting 
corruption are to be successful. Procurement rules alone cannot solve the problem of 
corruption. It is often thought that imposing the use of open procedures and limiting, 
to the maximum possible extent, the discretion of procurement officials is sufficient 
to fight corruption. However, this has proved to be unsuccessful and to have just 
increased the administrative burdens of the public authority. As Trepte (2005) points 
out, a balance needs to be struck between the need to curb the inappropriate use of 
discretion in the hands of procurement officials and allowing those same officials to 
exercise the professional judgment for which they were recruited and trained.  
Some suggestions are offered below for limiting the opportunities for corruption at 
the stage of the procurement process. These suggestions are made having as point 
of reference the UNCITRAL MODEL LAW on procurement (which is the model law that 
many developing countries use for reforming their national procurement system) and 
the abundance of literature on this subject.
4  
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4 This list is indicative only and by no means exhaustive.     20
•  The criteria for the selection of suppliers could be set by law or regulation and 
the procuring authority should be bound by those criteria, in so limiting the 
discretion of the public authority and avoiding the use of ad hoc solution aimed 
at favouring corrupted bidders (if a legislative process needs to be activated 
whenever a change to the criteria wants to be introduced the opportunity for 
corruption will be reduced). 
•  Another guarantee could be to pre-disclose the selection criteria to bidders and 
to forbid the procurement entity to change them once the process has started. 
•  At the specification stage it is important that specifications related to the 
product are not too burdensome and technical for suppliers to comply with 
them. Indeed, specifications can create unnecessary obstacles for the 
participation of bidders. The costs at this stage can be very difficult to monitor 
and weigh. When it is too costly to comply with national standards bidders 
could decide not to participate at all. At this stage it could be very easy for the 
procurement entity to set forth criteria that can be met just by very few and 
specific suppliers. This is so especially when the specifications are too technical 
and too specific without a real necessity. Any chance of competition is cut at 
the very first stage and without any opportunity for calculating the effective 
costs that such operations involve. This is why, as Arrowsmith et al note, 
specifications should be described in terms related to the function of the 
product rather than to trade-mark, name, patent or with reference to 
international standards rather than national ones (Arrowsmith et al 2000).  
•  Caution is also necessary at the qualification stage, the selection of suppliers in 
order to consider who is eligible for the contract. If a procuring entity is left 
with too much discretion at this stage there is the risk that some suppliers are 
opportunistically excluded from competition. Manipulation by the procurement 
entity can be easy at this stage and so it is necessary that the criteria for the 
exclusion of bidders are clearly set forth (Arrowsmith et al, 2000). 
•  As far as the award stage is concerned, contracts can be awarded according to 
the lowest price (which is possibly the most transparent way) or according to 
the lowest evaluated tender. In the latter case it is important that the 
evaluation is made on the basis of criteria that have been previously specified 
in the qualification documents. The criteria need also to be objective and 
quantifiable, by for instance giving them a relative weight or being expressed in 
monetary terms. 
•  A system should be in place which allows aggrieved suppliers to challenge the 
decisions of the procurement entity. Complaints should be dealt with, in a fast 
manner, by an independent, impartial and unbiased authority. The introduction 
of a quick and effective challenge/review procedure is essential to ensure 
probity and build suppliers’ confidence in the system.  
 
 
5  Procurement: Concerns and Problematic Issues  
Notwithstanding the gains that a system of free competition in procurement can 
bring, developing countries have been reluctant to join international agreements 
aimed at opening up public procurement to international competition and, in general, 
other type of agreements regulating procurement. For instance, within the WTO 
forum, reaching an agreement just on transparency in government procurement has 
proven unsuccessful partly because of the opposition from developing countries.     21
Developing countries asked at the Cancun Ministerial meeting of the WTO in 2003 
that the negotiations on transparency in government procurement be dropped from 
the negotiating agenda. In July 2004 the General Council actually made a decision to 
drop this as a negotiating issue during the Doha work programme. In this context, 
the EU proposal to include some commitments on procurement in EPAs with ACP 
states is very ambitious. Understanding the reasons why developing countries are 
reluctant to opening up public procurement to international competition and to reach 
an agreement on procurement at the international level is essential if a proposal by 
the EU to include procurement in EPAs is to be successful.  
It must be stressed that any discussion on how ACP countries could determine their 
negotiating position on procurement in EPAs must be mainly based on their revealed 
position on accessing the GPA and other WTO agreements. Formal EPA negotiations 
have not moved yet to a stage where market access issues on government 
procurement have been discussed and the official EU proposal on expanding the 
scope of the EPAs to government procurement is quite broad (based on the GPA and 
emphasizing transparency, national treatment and special and differential 
treatment).  Consequently, ACP countries have not yet expressed a formal view on 
what negotiating position they will endorse on including procurement in EPAs 
(although they have indicated resistance to the idea). Furthermore, there is scant 
empirical evidence on procurement in ACP countries; general discussions/doctrinal 
debates on the benefits for developing countries’ of accessing multilateral 
agreements on opening up trade in general and procurement in particular have been 
used as benchmarks.  
 
One of developing countries’ major concerns
5 for reaching an agreement on 
procurement is related to market access (Khor), in particular the perception that 
they are unlikely to derive any benefit from EU procurement while exposing their 
own firms to competition from the EU. There are also concerns about allowing 
foreign firms access in ‘sensitive’ markets, although these could be addressed 
through exceptions. In relation to a multilateral agreement on procurement 
Arrowsmith has noted that developing countries may be concerned with a reduced 
ability to use procurement to promote secondary policies (Arrowsmith, 2003), such 
as favouring disadvantaged groups in society, small enterprises or women. This is 
the case for South Africa where the use of procurement as a means to achieve 
secondary policies is required by the Constitution.
6 This concern has arisen in 
relation to developing countries joining the GPA and a transparency agreement on 
procurement.  
 
Specific concerns arise in the case of tied aid (Rege, 2001), when donor countries 
specifically require recipient countries to purchase the goods for the aid financed 
                                                 
5 For developing countries’ opposition on WTO negotiations on market access in 
procurement the Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement lists 
the issues raised and points made at: Information Note by the Chair, 5
th revision, 
24/9/1999, JOB(99)/5534 
6 For instance, in relation to the accession to the GPA, the fear that the accession to 
an international agreement on procurement could compromise the possibility to use 
procurement to promote social goals, has lead South Africa to adopt the view that “it 
might be opportune to resist accession to the agreement” as an official position 
Summary of Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement Reform in South Africa, 
Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Public Works, April 1997, Notice 691, Government 
Gazette, Vol. 382, No 17928      22
project from donors’ suppliers and/or products only. Tied aid is a practice widely 
implemented among donor countries, including some EU Member States, when they 
grant bilateral aid. Although aid granted by the EU is mostly untied, this is not the 
case for aid granted bilaterally by all individual EU Member states (only Britain and 
Ireland are declared as completely untied). As a large proportion of public 
investment is aid-financed, and the EU and its member states are collectively the 
dominant donors to ACP countries, substantial procurement is effectively financed 
through aid. The extent to which procurement is financed through tied aid will affect 
the scope of any agreement on procurement in EPAs.
7 
One possibility that the EU should consider for rendering any agreement more 
appealing to ACP countries is the commitment that, if an agreement is reached, it 
will lobby (commit) the individual EU Member States that have not already done so 
to untie their bilateral aid. In this way the procurement financed through EU member 
States’ bilateral aid is fully subject to any new agreement. Such a commitment would 
provide policy coherence and would ensure that any agreement reached with the EU 
on procurement brings to ACP countries potential development benefits. 
Another problem that might occur is related to the procurement rules that will be 
applied. For instance,  new rules  might conflict with national procurement reforms 
(where these have been undertaken). Additionally, possible problems might occur 
with other donors’ procurement rules (such as the World Bank). These two points are 
also linked to harmonisation of procurement rules and administrative costs 
highlighted below. One suggestion that could be made is to refer to the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on procurement when drawing the procurement rules that should be 
applied. Indeed, the Model law has already been used by many developing countries 
in order to reform their procurement systems. 
A related problem is that the EU might propose procurement rules that are 
inconsistent with ACP countries’ national procurement rules and/or impose further 
extra burdens to the administrative staff of ACP countries. For instance, the problem 
of harmonising procurement rules is very acute in relation to aid procurement. As 
shown in a study conducted for the OECD in Mali, a number of failings in terms of aid 
effectiveness and Mali’s ownership of aid were caused by the multitude of public 
procurement procedures applied. (OECD/DAC, 2000). The many, complex, 
procedures specific to each donor created a rupture with the newly reformed Malian 
system of procurement. Although the donors’ and the Malian government’s 
procurement procedures had common objectives and principles, the donors’ 
procurement procedures were very different to those of Mali in terms of the 
devolution of decision making power to the local agencies, procurement thresholds 
                                                 
7  The Commission has argued that granting tied aid infringes the EC internal market rules 
only when the procurement process is carried out by the EU Member States. However, in the 
majority of the cases the procurement process is instead carried out by the recipient country. 
Although in this latter eventuality the infringement of EU Law is less straightforward, it is 
present. La Chimia (European Law Review, 2007) argues that tied aid infringes EU Law even 
when the procurement process is carried out by the recipient country, because the tied aid 
condition, which is the cause of the discrimination, is imposed by the Member State. The 
recipient country, if it wants the aid, has no real choice but to fulfil the tied aid condition. 
Support for the view that Member States breach the EC Treaty provisions on free movement 
of goods when they set tied aid conditions can be found in the Open Skies case (Case C-
476/98, Commission v Federal Republic of Germany ('Open skies') [2002] E.C.R. I-9855 at 
paras. 144-162). 
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and specific awards and payments methods. The OECD study suggested that to 
remedy this situation the easiest choice should be to align with national procedures.
   
Implementing new procurement rules might have high administrative costs for ACP 
countries. Applying new rules involves resources, training of staff and even changes 
in the law. Many of these countries have recently implemented costly procurement 
reforms (or are in the process of implementing them). New rules might risk 
undermining and nullifying these efforts. Therefore a cautionary approach is 
necessary. The rules will need to take into account the specific situation peculiar to 
each ACP country, as ‘one size does not fit all’ in this context.  
A final factor to take into account is the possible accession to GPA of some EPA 
states (there are no problems with WTO in terms of public procurement because 
public procurement is exempted from the coverage of the GATT and GATS, although 
EPAs in general will have to comply with GATT Art. XXIV). Although no ACP countries 
are members or candidates to access the GPA at present, this situation might change 
(especially considering the pressure on developing countries to access the GPA). 
Since the EU is a member of the GPA it is essential that all EPA procurement rules 
are compatible with the GPA. The same would have to apply if any ACP country 
wished to accede to the GPA. 
 
6   Final Considerations and Implications 
Competition policy can be defined as a set of measures employed by government to 
ensure a fair competitive market environment, typically involving competition laws 
and Competition Authorities. Competition policy aims to ensure that markets become 
and remain competitive. This is particularly important in ACP countries where there is 
often only one or a few major firms in important sectors, so potential abuse of 
dominant position may be a concern. It is precisely because these countries are 
prone to abuses of dominant position, whether by domestic or foreign firms, that it is 
important to establish the institutions to address basic competition policy. The paper 
reviews general issues regarding the desirability of a competition policy, considering 
the reasons why some countries are opposed (typically the concern is with including 
measures relating to competition policy in international agreements rather than with 
promoting competition per se). Although there is little quantitative evidence on the 
benefits of a competition policy, there is evidence on the incidence of anti-
competitive practices in SSA countries (the only ACP countries for which good 
documentation is available). As anti-competitive practices are quite widespread, it 
can be inferred that they impose costs, so implementing competition policy would 
provide benefits that may, in economic welfare terms, be quite large. Section 3 
discusses the main issues to address in establishing a competition policy.  
There are many policy options that can increase competition in the domestic market 
– deregulation, trade liberalization and other market opening policies are examples. 
The trade reforms inherent in EPAs and the associated moves towards greater 
regional integration will promote increased competition. Competition policy may then 
be seen as the institutional mechanism to ensure that markets remain accessible and 
contestable, and the Competition Authority is its organizational counterpart. As it is 
desirable to promote and regulate competition, there are benefits to be had from 
establishing some level of competition policy in ACP countries. While competition 
policy can be implemented effectively at the country level, and indeed the focus at 
least initially should be on the national level, given the prevalence of trade, foreign 
investment and integration it is evident that regional cooperation and coordination is 
important. Whilst it may be inappropriate for EPAs to act as drivers of competition     24
policy, they can support the process, especially the regional dimension. By including 
(minimal) commitments in this regard, EPAs can support the establishment of 
effective Competition Authorities, and there is evidence that once established 
Competition Authorities gain acceptance. 
The second part of the paper reviews the (economic) literature on increasing 
transparency and opening up procurement and outlines the main potential sources of 
welfare gains. In recent years many developed and developing countries, although 
few ACP countries, have undertaken reforms of their national procurement systems 
to promote transparency and have reached agreements opening up their 
procurement market to international competition.  These reforms are aimed at 
ensuring that public funds are used in the most efficient way with greater 
transparency, probity and accountability so that the system delivers value for 
money. Studies on the effect of reforming procurement provide evidence that 
competitive and transparent procurement processes help public authorities acquire 
better quality goods and services at lower costs. It is essential to include 
transparency provisions to ensure that the opening up of procurement is effective.  
The advantages for most developing, especially ACP, countries in opening up 
procurement to international competition are domestic (gains from access to other 
countries’ markets are unlikely to be significant): open and transparent procurement 
encourages competition that is likely to bring gains in terms of lower cost provision 
of public goods and services and reduced corruption. Gains could also occur in terms 
of regional integration by giving to ACP firms the possibility to access other ACP 
countries’ markets (provided that procurement is open at a multilateral level towards 
all EPA countries or within EPA regions). In this way, regional integration provides a 
rationale for regional procurement policies, and as this has implications for 
competition it is associated with regional competition policy. In the context of EPAs, 
easier market access for the EU and greater integration will encourage foreign and 
domestic investment (Morrissey, 2008), while measures to improve trade facilitation 
support competition and investment (Milner et al, 2008). Thus, EPAs are likely to 
increase competitiveness and competition in domestic and regional markets, 
implying a need for (regional) competition policy and facilitating potential gains from 
more open procurement. 
Section 5 addresses the main concerns and problematic issues related to including 
procurement in international agreements, in particular why developing countries 
appear opposed to this. While the case for reforming procurement processes is 
strong, especially for transparency, including commitments in EPAs will be 
contentious (as for competition policy). It is desirable that any agreement between 
the EU and ACP on procurement involves the enactment of procurement rules aimed 
at ensuring transparency and at avoiding discrimination in favour of national 
suppliers.  However, as noted above, most developing countries have opposed any 
WTO discussions even on transparency in government procurement (they are even 
more resistant to opening up), and EU proposals encounter the same opposition in 
EPA negotiations.  Proposals could be more attractive for ACP countries if an 
agreement to insert procurement in EPAs included, together with market access, 
provisions aimed at enhancing transparency. Transparency alone can provide 
benefits by reducing corruption and transaction costs. Given that there is limited 
competition within individual ACP countries (and regions), opening up procurement 
to foreign providers will increase competition with greater potential benefits through 
reduced costs. Opening up also increases the rationale for competition policy.  
At a practical level, one could envisage procurement being opened up at different 
speeds in different sectors – the most sensitive being retained for domestic firms and     25
others being retained for regional firms – whilst introducing broad-based 
transparency measures. The EU proposal suggests an agreement where ACP 
countries will open up their procurement markets towards each other (and possibly 
also towards the EU) with potential benefits for ACP countries in terms of regional 
integration and new market access opportunities. Moreover, the fear of easy 
penetration and dominance of EU firms in ACP countries’ markets could be overcome 
by establishing a system which requires EU firms to form joint ventures with ACP 
firms (this is often the case for EDF-financed contracts). Open and transparent 
procurement would also function better in the presence of a Competition Policy, 
especially if this is at a regional level. 
However, an agreement aimed at opening up procurement between all ACP countries 
might considerably burden the negotiating process (especially if the EU is to be 
included). There might be practical difficulties of negotiating in the EPA for one 
region opening in favour of another region. This is especially so because several EPA 
regions reject any rules on government procurement; it might be easier to start by 
limiting any agreement on procurement to one EPA region at a time. Similar 
concerns apply in the case of Competition Policy. Furthermore, the needs and 
capabilities of individual ACP countries and regions differ so any regulatory reforms 
must reflect and accommodate the country context. Whilst it would be inadvisable to 
propose ambitious or demanding competition or procurement regulatory reforms in 
EPAs, the liberalization inherent in EPAs and regional integration imply that 
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